Abstract-Yao's garbled circuit construction transforms a boolean circuit C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m into a "garbled circuit" C along with n pairs of k-bit keys, one for each input bit, such that C together with the n keys corresponding to an input x reveal C(x) and no additional information about x. The garbled circuit construction is a central tool for constant-round secure computation and has several other applications.
INTRODUCTION
Yao's garbled circuit (GC) construction [41] is an efficient transformation which maps any boolean circuit C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m together with secret randomness into a "garbled circuit" C along with n pairs of short k-bit keys (K 0 i , K 1 i ), such that for any (unknown) input x, the garbled circuit C together with the n keys K x = (K x1 1 , . . . , K xn n ) reveal C(x) but give no additional information about x. The latter requirement is formalized by requiring the existence of an efficient decoder which recovers C(x) from ( C, K x ) and an efficient simulator which given C(x) samples from a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from ( C, K x ). The keys are short in the sense that their length k does not depend on the size of C. Yao's celebrated result shows that such a transformation can be based on the existence of any pseudorandom generator [9] , [40] , or equivalently a one-way function [20] .
The GC construction was originally motivated by the problem of secure multiparty computation [40] , [18] . Until recently, Yao's construction provided the only general technique for constant-round secure computation [41] , [8] , [27] , [25] . The recent breakthrough results on fully homomorphic encryption [16] , [17] , [10] give an alternative technique for constant-round secure computation that has better (in fact, nearly optimal) asymptotic communication complexity, but is still quite inefficient in practice. Along the years, the GC construction has found a diverse range of other applications to problems such as computing on encrypted data [38] , [11] , parallel cryptography [4] , [3] , verifiable computation [15] , [6] , software protection [19] , functional encryption [37] , and key-dependent message security [7] , [1] .
In some natural application scenarios, the GC construction still provides the only known technique for obtaining general feasibility results. As a simple example, imagine a scenario of sending a computationally weak device U to the field in order to perform some expensive computation C on sensitive data x. The computation is too complex for U to quickly perform it on its own, but since the input x is sensitive it cannot just send the entire input out. The GC technique provides the only known non-interactive solution: In an offline phase, before going to the field, U publishes C and privately keeps the list of keys (K 0 i , K 1 i ). Once it observes the input x, it suffices for U to select the corresponding keys K x and sends them out -an inexpensive operation whose cost is independent of the complexity of C. The rest of the world can, at this point, recover C(x) and nothing else.
It is instructive to take a slightly more abstract view at the features of the GC construction that are useful in the above application. The device U uses its secret randomness r to generate a garbled circuit C and n pairs of keys in an offline phase. When the input x arrives, it selects the n keys K x corresponding to x. Overall, x is mapped via an efficient randomized transformation into the stringŷ = ( C, K x ) which reveals the output y = C(x) but hides all additional information about x. Thusŷ can be viewed as a randomized encoding of C(x) [22] , [4] . An important feature of this encoding is that each input x i influences only on a small part of the encodingŷ (a single short key) via a simple function. The simple and short dependency of the encoded output on the inputs x i makes the above solution efficient. This is the key feature of the GC construction that is used by essentially all of its applications.
The arithmetic setting. Despite its fundamental nature and the wide array of applications, Yao's original result has not been significantly improved or generalized since the 1980s. One longstanding question is that of finding an efficient variant of the GC construction which applies to arithmetic circuits. An arithmetic circuit over a ring R is defined similarly to a standard boolean circuit, except that each wire carries an element of R and each gate can perform an addition or multiplication operation over R. Since arithmetic computations arise in many real-life scenarios, this question has a natural motivation in the context of most of the applications discussed above.
Before we formulate our precise notion of garbling arithmetic circuits, let us briefly explain the disadvantages of some natural solution approaches. Yao's original construction requires C to include an "encrypted truth-table" for each binary gate of C. This can be naturally extended to the case of non-binary gates, but at the cost of a quadratic blowup in the size of the input domain (cf. [32] ). In particular, this approach is not feasible at all for arithmetic computations over rings of super-polynomial size.
An asymptotically better approach is to implement the arithmetic circuit by an equivalent boolean circuit (replacing each R-operation by a corresponding boolean sub-circuit). Given the bit-representation of the inputs, this approach can be used to simulate the arithmetic computation with an overhead which depends on the boolean complexity of ring operations. While providing reasonable asymptotic efficiency in theory (e.g., via fast integer multiplication techniques), the concrete overhead of this approach is quite high. Moreover, there are scenarios where one does not have access to bits of the inputs and must treat them as atomic ring elements. For example, in the context of computing on encrypted data, 1 one may wish to encrypt large integers using an additively homomorphic encryption scheme such as Pallier's encryption [33] . In this scenario, there is no efficient non-interactive procedure for obtaining (encrypted) individual bits of the input; the only feasible operations on encrypted inputs include addition and scalar multiplication.
Garbling arithmetic circuits. The above discussion motivates the following arithmetic analogue of Yao's result:
Can we efficiently transform an arithmetic circuit C : R n → R m into a garbled circuit C, along with n affine key functions L i : R → R k , such that C together with the n outputs L i (x i ) reveal C(x) and no additional information about x? We refer to a general transformation as above as an affine randomized encoding (ARE) compiler over R. An affine function L i is of the form L i (x i ) = a i x i + b i where a i , b i are vectors in R k that may depend on the secret randomness but not on the input x. We view the output of L i as a "key" and require its length k to be independent of the size of C, as in the boolean case. The above requirement captures the abstract feature discussed above of a "simple" and "short" dependency of the encoded output on the inputs, where the notion of simplicity is adapted to the arithmetic setting.
It is instructive to observe that the original formulation of the GC construction coincides with the above formulation of an ARE compiler over the binary field. Indeed, when R = F 2 , the i-th key function a i x i + b i outputs a selection between b i and a i ⊕ b i depending on the value of x i , which is equivalent to having x i select between a pair of short keys. An ARE compiler can be used to efficiently extend the applications of the GC construction to the arithmetic setting while avoiding the need to access individual bits of the input. This can lead to stronger theoretical feasibility results (where parties are restricted to arithmetic computations on ring elements) as well as to efficiency improvements.
Our Contribution
We present a general framework for constructing ARE compilers along with an efficient instantiation over the ring of integers. Our main compiler transforms an arithmetic circuit C : Z n → Z m over integers from a bounded (but possibly exponential) range 2 into a garbled circuit C along with n affine functions L i : Z → Z k such that C together with the n integer vectors L i (x i ) reveal C(x) and no additional information about x. The security of this construction relies on the hardness of the learning with error (LWE) problem of Regev [35] .
We also present a simpler direct construction of an ARE compiler over the integers based on a general assumption (the existence of one-way function). This is done by combining Yao's construction with previous informationtheoretic randomization techniques via the Chinese Remainder Theorem (see Section 8) . While this approach provides a stronger feasibility result, it does not enjoy the efficiency and generality advantages of our main approach. For example, for some natural classes of arithmetic circuits (including ones computing constant-degree polynomials over integers) we obtain a "constant rate" encoding whose length is only a constant multiple of the description length of the function, independently of the integer size or the security parameter (see Section 7.2). This type of efficiency seems inherently impossible to get using the approach of Section 8 or any alternative technique from the literature. The technical core of our LWE-based construction relies on a special "functional encryption" scheme which yields a succinct encoding for affine circuits (see Section 6) . This scheme may be of independent interest.
A new framework for garbled circuits. On the conceptual level, we suggest a new general view of garbled circuits. This view provides a clean reduction from the task of constructing ARE compilers over a general ring R to the construction of a simple primitive over R. (See Section 2.) As a result, any new instantiation of this primitive over a ring R would immediately imply an ARE compiler over R with related efficiency. This has the potential to improve both the efficiency of our LWE-based instantiation (e.g., achieving a constant rate for larger classes of circuits) and its generality (e.g., applying to general circuits over large finite fields F p ). 3 Our new framework also leads to a conceptually simpler derivation of Yao's original result for boolean circuits (see Section 2 below). We believe that this more general view leads to a better understanding of Yao's classical result which has remained essentially untouched since the 1980s.
OUR TECHNIQUES
Our starting point is an information-theoretic ARE for simple low-depth circuits. Previous randomized encoding techniques from the literature [26] , [12] , [23] , [13] imply ARE compilers over finite rings that are weaker from our main notion of ARE compiler in two ways. First, these compilers can only efficiently apply to restricted classes of circuits such as arithmetic formulas and branching programs. Second, even for these classes, known constructions require the length of each key to be bigger than the representation size of the function (i.e., formula or branching program size), contradicting our requirement of having short keys. A key idea which underlies our approach is that a solution for the second problem can lead to a solution for the first one. Details follow.
Imagine that we have a key-shrinking gadget which allows us to transform an affine encoding with long keys c, d into an affine encoding with short keys a, b. Now we can encode an arithmetic circuit C as follows. Instead of individually considering each wire and gate of C as in the original garbled circuit construction, we view C as a composition of "simple" circuits, called layers, and will build the encoder by processing one layer at a time, starting from the outputs (top layer) and proceeding towards the inputs (bottom layer).
Assume that C consists of i+1 layers of depth 1 each, and that we already encoded the top i layers of C. Specifically, let C denote the sub-circuit which consists the top i layers, B denote the depth-1 circuit in the bottom layer, and y = B(x). Namely, C(x) = C (B(x)). Suppose that Enc is an affine encoding with k-bit long keys for the function C (y ). Then, an encoding Enc of C(x) is obtained using the following three steps:
• (Substitution) First we take the encoding Enc (y ) and substitute y with B(x). Let f (x) = Enc (B(x)) denote the resulting randomized function. Since Enc encodes C , we have that f encodes C. However, even if Enc is affine (in y ), the encoding f may not be affine (in x) as the layer B may contain multiplication gates. For instance, if the first entry of y is the product of the pair x 1 , x 2 , then f will contain outputs of the form Q = a 1 * (x 1 * x 2 ) + b 1 .
• (Affinization) We turn f into an affine encoder g by applying to each of its outputs the information-theoretic encoder of arithmetic formulas. Here we rely on the fact that the above expression Q is finite and thus has a constant size formula. (See Section 5 for more details.) The problem is that now the keys of the encoding g are longer (by a constant factor) than those of Enc , and so if we repeat this process, the size of the keys will become exponential in the depth.
• (Key shrinking) We fix the latter problem by first rearranging terms into blocks (grouping together outputs that depend on the same variable) and then applying the key-shrinking gadget to each output block. As a result, the size of the keys is reduced at the cost of generating additional outputs that do not depend on the inputs and thus can be accumulated in the garbled circuit part. See Section 6.1 for more details.
Shrinking the keys in the binary case. The above process reduces the construction of ARE compilers to an implementation of the key-shrinking gadget. In the binary case, this can be done quite easily with the help of a standard symmetric encryption scheme. For simplicity, let us treat affine functions as "selector" functions in which a bit s selects one of two vectors K 0 and K 1 . We denote this operation by s
(Selectors and affine functions are essentially equivalent in the binary domain.) Our goal can be described as follows: We are given the function f (y, c, d) = y (c, d), where y is a bit and c, d are long keys, and we would like to encode it by a function of the form g(y, c, d; r) = (W, y (a, b)). The new keys a, b may depend on c, d and on the randomness r (but not on y) and should be shorter than c and d (e.g., of length equal to the security parameter). The string W can also depend on c, d and r, and may be of arbitrary polynomial length. 4 A simple way to implement g is to employ symmetric encryption, where c is encrypted under the random key a and d under the random key b. Then g can output the two ciphertexts E a (c), E b (d) together with the value y (a, b). The ciphertexts should be permuted in a random order, as otherwise the value of y is leaked and the security of the encoding is compromised.
It is not hard to see that g satisfies our syntactic requirements and, in addition, its output allows one to recover the value y (c, d) by decrypting the corresponding ciphertext using the key y (a, b). This variant of the gadget assumes that the encryption is verifiable (i.e., decryption with incorrect key can be identified), and it typically leads to a statistically small decoding error (as in the GC variant of [28] ). A perfectly correct version can be achieved by appending to the encoding the value π ⊕ y, where π is the random bit which determines the order of the ciphertexts (i.e., the pair E a (c), E b (d) is permuted if and only if π = 1). During the decoding, this additional information points to the ciphertext which should be decrypted, without revealing any additional information. (This version corresponds to the GC variant in [8] , [32] , [3] .)
Shrinking the keys in the arithmetic case. In the arithmetic case, the function f is affine, i.e., f (y, c, d) = cy + d, and we would like to encode it by the function g(y, c, d; r) = (W, ay + b) where y is an element from the ring R, a, b, c, d are vectors over R, and the syntactic properties are similar to the previous case (e.g., a and b should be short). For simplicity, assume in the following that R is a finite field. We reduce the key shrinking problem to the following primitive: find a randomized function which maps a pair of keys c, d ∈ R n into a pair of (possibly longer) keys u, v ∈ R N such that (1) yu + v encodes yc + d, and (2) for every choice of y, c, d and z in the support of yu + v, the distribution of u conditioned on yu + v = z can be "hidden" (planted) in a linear space of dimension k, proportional to the security parameter. That is, a random linear space containing u is computationally indistinguishable from a totally random linear space. Given this primitive, the key-shrinking gadget g can be constructed as follows: Pick u, v ∈ R N using the primitive, pick random a, b
such that W a = u and W b = v, and finally output (W, ya + b). Decoding is done by computing the product W · (ya + b), which, by linear algebra, equals to yu + v and thus reveals yc + d. The "hiding" requirement implies that no other information is revealed. While we do not know how to implement the primitive over finite fields (nor can we rule out the existence of such an implementation), we implement a similar primitive over the integers under the LWE assumption. The main technical content of our work is devoted to this construction, which is described in detail in Section 6.
3. PRELIMINARIES We recall the learning with error (LWE) problem, explicitly put forward by Regev [35] . Let κ be a security parameter and let k = k(κ) (dimension) and q = q(κ) (modulus) be positive integers. Let χ = χ(κ) (noise distribution) and S = S(k) (information distribution) be a pair of probability distributions over Z q(κ) . Let U q denote the uniform distribution over Z q . Definition 3.1 (Learning with Errors). The search learning with errors assumption SLWE(k, q, χ, S) asserts that for every polynomial m = m(k) the following holds. Given the
it is infeasible to recover s with more than negligible probability in κ. The decisional learning with errors assumption DLWE(k, q, χ, S) asserts that for every polynomial
In this work both S and χ will be instantiated with a "rectangular" probability distribution Φ ρ in which an element of Z q is chosen uniformly at random from the interval [−ρ, +ρ], and where ρ = q Ω(1) . While this is somewhat non-standard, it can be shown that, for our choice of parameters (i.e., q is superpolynomial in κ), this variant of DLWE is implied by SLWE in the more standard setting in which S is uniform over Z q and χ is a Gaussian noise of
. (For this we employ the results of [2] , [34] . See full version for details.)
In our construction we will let q = (U + 2 κ ) O(1) and k = log γ q, where κ is a security parameter, U is an upper bound on the range of wire values, and γ > 1 is a constant. The choice of γ affects the efficiency of the construction. Smaller γ means better efficiency under a stronger assumption. Known approximation algorithms for the lattice shortest vector problem (SVP) imply that the assumption is false for γ < 1. For γ > 1, the best known attacks require superpolynomial time and our assumption can be reduced to the conjectured hardness of approximating SVP [34] to within subexponential factors (i.e., 2 k where vanishes with γ). (See [35] , [34] , [29] , [36] for a survey of DLWE and related lattice problems.)
AFFINE RANDOMIZED ENCODINGS
In this section, we define our main goal of garbling arithmetic circuits. This goal can be viewed as an instance of the general notion of randomized encoding put forward in [22] , [4] . Here we would like to transform a "complex" arithmetic computation into a "simple" randomized arithmetic computation, where the output of the latter encodes the output of the former and (computationally) hides all additional information about the input. Our notion of simplicity directly generalizes the features of Yao's construction in the boolean case: On input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z n , the output (W, L 1 , . . . , L n ) includes a "garbled circuit part" W , which is independent of the input and depends only on bits of randomness, and n short "keys" where the i-th key is computed by applying an affine (degree-1) function L i , determined only by the randomness, to the i-th input x i . The complexity of the construction should be polynomial in the size of the circuit being encoded, a cryptographic security parameter, and an upper bound on the bit-length of the values of circuit wires. Furthermore, the size of the keys should be independent of the circuit size.
We now formalize the above. We use a minimal model of arithmetic circuits which allows only addition, subtraction, and multiplication operations. The circuit does not have access to the bit representation of the inputs. In the randomized case, we allow the circuit to pick random inputs from {0, 1}.
Definition 4.1 (Arithmetic circuits). An arithmetic circuit C is syntactically similar to a standard boolean circuit, except that the gates are labeled by '+' (addition), '-' (subtraction) or '*' (multiplication)
In the randomized case, C R (x) outputs a distribution over R m induced by a uniform and independent choice of r j from {0, 1}. We denote by C R (x; r) the output of C R on inputs x i ∈ R and independent random inputs r j ∈ {0, 1}. When R is omitted, it is understood to be the ring Z of integers.
Definition 4.2 (Affine circuits).
We say that a randomized arithmetic circuit C is affine if its outputs are partitioned into n+1 vectors (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n ), where y 0 depends only on the random inputs r j , and each y i is of the form a i * x i + b i where a i and b i are vectors of ring elements that depend only on the random inputs r j . In the context of our construction, we will refer to y 0 as the garbled circuit part and to the other y i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as keys. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we denote the i-th key length |y i | by i .
We now define the notion of an affine randomized encoding compiler, which captures our main goal of garbling arithmetic circuits. Here we restrict the attention to the ring of integers R = Z, though later we will also refer to variants that apply to arithmetic computations over finite fields or rings. • Inputs: a security parameter 1 κ , an arithmetic circuit C over the integers, and a positive integer U bounding the values of circuit wires.
• Outputs: randomized affine circuits Enc (encoder) and Sim (simulator), and a boolean circuit Dec (decoder). By default, we require that Enc output short keys. That is, each key length i (see Definition 4.2) should be bounded by a fixed polynomial in κ and log U , independently of |C|. We will sometimes refer to Enc as an affine randomized encoding (or ARE) of C.
We require an ARE compiler to satisfy the following correctness and privacy requirements. An ARE compiler T , as above, is (computationally) private if every nonuniform adversary A of size poly(κ) wins the above game with at most 1/2 + κ −ω(1) probability. We say that T is statistically private if the above holds for an unbounded A, and is perfectly private if the winning probability is 1/2.
The above definitions can be naturally modified to capture ARE over a finite ring R by letting C,Enc,Dec, and Sim be defined by arithmetic circuits over R. In this case, Enc and Sim are allowed to sample uniform elements from R and we also eliminate the bound U on the values of circuit wires.
Remark 4.6 (Applicability of previous techniques).
Previous randomized encoding techniques from the literature [26] , [12] , [23] , [13] imply ARE compilers over finite rings that are weaker from our main notion of ARE compiler in two ways. First, these compilers can only efficiently apply to restricted classes of circuits such as arithmetic formulas and branching programs. Second, even for these classes, the previous constructions yield AREs in which the length of each key is bigger than the representation size of the function (i.e., formula or branching program size), contradicting our requirement of having short keys. See Section 5 for further details on these previous constructions. In Section 8, we describe an indirect approach for combining these previous techniques with Yao's construction for boolean circuits to yield a general ARE compiler that meets the above definition. However, this compiler does not have the efficiency and generality advantages of the main compiler we present in Section 7.
We will rely on natural concatenation and composition properties of randomized encodings: a circuit C with multiple outputs can be encoded by concatenating the encodings for each output [4, Lemma 4.9], and two encoders can be composed by using one to encode the function computed by the other [3, Lemma 3.5] . In fact, we will use an extension of these properties that allows to concatenate or compose polynomially many encodings, which follows from a standard hybrid argument.
In the following, we will be more loose in our use of notation. We will sometimes implicitly identify a concrete function f with an arithmetic circuit computing it and (following [4] ) will denote byf the encoder Enc corresponding to f . We will also replace arithmetic circuits by weaker arithmetic computational models such as arithmetic branching programs. Finally, while our presentation does not make the compiler T explicit, it is easy to verify that the encoder, decoder, and simulator we describe can be efficiently constructed given the inputs for T .
AFFINIZATION GADGETS
The first building block of our ARE compiler is an affinization gadget, which provides a statistical ARE for simple arithmetic functions. To this end, we rely on perfect ARE compilers for functions in low arithmetic complexity classes that are implicit in the secure computation literature. In particular, any arithmetic circuit C over a finite ring R for which each output depends on at most d inputs admits a perfect ARE with key length 2 O(d) . More generally:
Fact 5.1 (Affinization gadget over finite rings). There is a perfect ARE compiler for arithmetic branching programs or arithmetic formulas over any finite ring R. For a formula or branching program of size s, the key is of length O(s 2 ).
The above result can be obtained via a randomization of an iterated matrix product [26] , [12] , [14] , [13] or the determinant [21] , [23] , [13] . See [13] , [6] for further discussion and pointers.
We would like to obtain a similar variant over the integers. For this, we first embed the computation in a sufficiently large finite ring Z p and then encode the computation modulo p over the integers by adding a sufficiently large random multiple of p. The latter step relies on the following fact.
Lemma 5.2 (Encoding modular reduction)
. Let X, p, µ be positive integers such that X > p. Define f : [−X, X] → Z p by f (x) = x mod p. Then, for a uniformly random r ∈ [0, µ], the functionf (x; r) = x + rp (computed over the integers) is a randomized encoding of f with statistical privacy error ε ≤ 2X/(pµ).
Combining Fact 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, we get our main affinization gadget.
Corollary 5.3 (Affinization gadget over the integers).
There is a perfectly correct, statistically private ARE compiler for arithmetic branching programs or arithmetic formulas over the integers. For a formula or branching program f of size s, the resulting keys have length O(s 2 ) and bit-length O(log U + κ), where U is an upper bound on the absolute values of the inputs and outputs, and κ is a statistical security parameter.
Proof: We start by viewing f as a function over Z p , choosing large enough p (say, p = O(U )) to avoid modular reduction. We then apply the ARE of Fact 5.1, yielding a perfect AREf over Z p with key length O(s 2 ). Viewing the key functions of this ARE as functions over the integers, their outputs have bit-length O(log U ). Applying Lemma 5.2 to each entry off , we get a statistical AREf over the integers with key-length O(s 2 ) and bit-length O(log U + κ).
We will mainly apply the affinization gadget to the function f (x 1 x 2 + x 3 ), where x i ∈ [0, 2 λ ] and operations are over the integers. In the full version we give a selfcontained description of this instance of the affinization gadget. Specifically, we show that f admits a statistically 2 −κ -private ARE over the integers with non-negative keys a i , b i of length i ≤ 2 and bit-length 2λ + κ + 2. We refer to this version of the affinization gadget as the basic gadget and to the version of Corollary 5.3 as the generalized gadget.
THE KEY-SHRINKING GADGET
In this section we describe an efficient LWE-based implementation of the key-shrinking gadget: a computationally private randomized encoding of the function g(y, c, d) = yc+d, where c, d ∈ Z n and y ∈ Z (see below for restrictions on the input domain), by a function of the form
where the outputs of a and b are shorter than c and d. More concretely, the length requirement is that a and b output vectors in Z k for k which can depend (polynomially) on κ and log U but not on n. In the main instance of our final construction, n will be a constant multiple of k. We will also need the bit-length of each entry of a (resp., b) to be smaller by a constant factor than the maximal bit-length of each entry of c (resp., d). In contrast to our main notion of ARE, we do not restrict the functions W, a, b other than being computable in polynomial time from the bits of their inputs. Since we will only apply the gadget on inputs c, d that are derived from bits of randomness (rather than from an input x i of the original circuit), this will not violate the syntactic requirements of ARE in our final construction.
The Construction
Intuition. The encodingĝ follows the outline described in Section 2. First, c and d are represented by u and v via an invertible randomized mapping, i.e., by multiplying by a large constant ∆ and adding some noise. (The mapping is invertible because of the low magnitude of the noise). Then the vectors u and v are planted in a random linear space W of a low dimension k. The space W is made public. Now every linear combination of u and v lies in W , and so it can be succinctly described by its coefficients with respect to W . In particular, to reveal the output yc+d, it suffices for the encoding to reveal the coefficients of its representation yu + v. We proceed with a formal description.
Parameters. Positive integers k, ρ a , ρ b , µ c , µ d , ∆ and a prime number q. The parameter k determines the key length of the encoding and ρ a , ρ b determine a bound on the key entries. The parameters ∆ and µ c , µ d are used to define the (randomized) embedding of c and d in the (larger) vectors u and v. We assume that k < n, ρ c ≥ ρ a , and ρ d ≥ ρ b , where ρ c , ρ d upper-bound the values of c, d. (These upperbounds are given as part of the input.) All parameters can be chosen as functions of κ and U under constraints that will be specified later (see Lemma 6.1 and the following discussion). Let Φ α denotes the uniform distribution over the integers in the interval [±α] .
We construct the encodingĝ as follows. (1) is equal to yu + v modulo q; (b) The above equality holds over the integers as well (since q is large enough to avoid wraparound); (c) ∆ is large enough to ensure that there is no rounding error in step (2) .
Given z = yc + d we simulate the output (W, f ) of g(y, c, d) as follows. Choose f . In the full version we use a hybrid argument to show that, under DLWE, the above distribution is computationally indistinguishable from g(y, c, d). Roughly speaking, we first show thatĝ(y, c, d) is statistically close to a distribution D(y, c, d) in which instead of planting the vectors u and v in span(W ), we plant the vectors u and w (as defined above). Then, we show that, under DLWE, the vector u is hidden in span(W ) and W is indistinguishable from a random matrix which spans w.
Setting the parameters. Suppose that
is prime, k = log γ q (for γ > 1), and n ≤ poly(k). With this choice of parameters, the conditions of Lemma 6.1 are met under a conservative instance of the DLWE assumption. Note that in the above choice of parameters, both the key-length (i.e., number of entries) and the bit-length of the keys a, b are independent of the corresponding parameters of the inputs c, d. In particular, they can be polynomially smaller.
Complexity. Let τ = log q = O(κ + log U + log ρ c + log ρ d ), and let W i denote the i-th column of the matrixW . We partition the output of the gadget into three parts: (1) Elements that depend on the "key selector" y, namely the vector y · a(r) + b(r) which consist of k = τ γ elements each of bit length smaller than τ . (2) The k − 2 columns W 1 , . . . , W k−2 which consist of n(k − 2) = O(nτ γ ) elements of bit length τ ; and (3) the columns W k−1 , W k which consist of O(n) elements of bit length τ . We distinguish the k − 2 leftmost columns from the other columns because the former part of the encoding consist only of public coins, and can be reused among different instantiations of the gadget. (See full version for more details.) This will allow us to reduce the length of the ARE when employing many copies of the key-shrinking gadget.
GARBLING ARITHMETIC CIRCUITS
In this section we combine the affinization gadget and the key-shrinking gadget for obtaining our main result: an efficient ARE compiler for general arithmetic circuits over integers from a bounded range. Some optimizations for specific families of functions (e.g., low degree polynomials) will be presented in Section 7.2.
The Main Construction
Let C be an arithmetic circuit. Instead of individually considering each wire and gate of C as in the original garbled circuit construction, we will build the encoder by processing one layer at a time. For simplicity, we assume that C is already given in a layered form. That is,
where each B i is a depth-1 circuit. 5 We denote by y i (values of) variables corresponding to the input wires of layer B i . That is,
, where y 0 = C(x) and y h = x. We denote by C i the function mapping y i to the output of C; that is,
is the identity function on the outputs.
The ARE compiler, on inputs κ, U, C, starts by setting the parameters for the key-shrinking gadget. The bounds ρ c , ρ d are set to 2 η(κ+log U ) for some constant η > 1. (The constant η is derived from the parameters of the affinization gadget; for our basic affinization gadget, η = 4 suffices.) The remaining parameters are picked as discussed following Lemma 6.1. The value of n may vary in different invocations of the gadget, but will be at most 2kφ, where φ is the maximal fan-out of gates of C.
The compiler builds the encoding Enc in an iterative fashion, processing the layers of C from top (outputs) to bottom (inputs). It starts with a trivial encoding of the identity function C 0 . In iteration i, i = 1, 2, . . . , h, it transforms an ARE for
, then applying the affinization gadget to bring the resulting function into an affine form (at the cost of increasing the size of the keys), and finally applying the key-shrinking gadget to reduce the size of the keys (at the cost of generating additional outputs that do not depend on the inputs). This process terminates with an ARE of C h (y h ) = C(x).
More precisely, the encoder Enc produced by the ARE compiler is obtained as follows. For simplicity, we treat encoders as probabilistic circuits and omit their random inputs from the notation. (by a factor which is at most twice the fan-out of B i ) and have bigger entries. c) Key shrinking. To avoid the exponential blowup of keys, the compiler applies the key-shrinking gadget. For every output Q = c j y i j + d j of G that has length n > k or has large key entries (i.e., c j,h > ρ a or d j,h > ρ b for some h), the key-shrinking gadget is applied to bring it to the form (W, a j y
k , and a j , b j , W depend only on random inputs. (In fact, in our implementation of the key-shrinking gadget a j , b j are picked uniformly at random from their domain.) The W entries will be aggregated and will form the garbled circuit part of the output. Let Enc i (y i ) be the affine encoding resulting from this step.
The decoder and simulator are obtained by applying a similar iterative process based on the decoders and simulators of the two gadgets. Correctness and privacy follow from the natural concatenation and composition properties of randomized encodings (see full version). Indeed, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h, the randomized function
. It follows from the composition property that Enc(x) = E h (x) is a randomized encoding of C(x) = E 0 (x), as required. Note that since gadgets are applied on the values of all intermediate wires y i j , the correctness and privacy of the final encoding Enc is only guaranteed on inputs x for which the absolute value of every wire in C is bounded by U .
The security properties of the construction are captured by the following main theorem: Theorem 7.1. Suppose γ > 1 is such that for every choice of q ∈ 2 O(κ) and discrete Gaussian χ over Z q with standard deviation q Ω(1) , the assumption SLWE(k, q, χ, S) holds with k = max(log q, κ) γ and a uniform information distribution S. Then the above construction (with dimension parameter γ) yields a perfectly correct, computationally private ARE compiler as defined in Section 4.
Complexity. We measure the output length of the encoding in terms of elements whose bit length is τ = O(κ + log U ). Each key consists of k = O(τ γ ) elements. In addition, each input or internal gate with fan-out adds an overhead of O(k τ γ ) elements to the "garbled-circuit" part of the encoding. By reusing the public randomness of the keyshrinking gadget, this can be improved to O(k ) plus an additional "one-time" cost of O(kLτ γ ) where L is the maximal fan-out. This makes the total complexity O(k) elements per wire, plus O(kLτ γ ) additional elements. In a typical scenario, where the integers are large enough compared to the security parameter (i.e., κ = O(log U )) and the circuit is large enough compared to the integers (i.e., L(log U ) 2γ = O(|C|)), the encoding contains O((log U ) γ ) elements of bit-length O(log U ) per wire.
Constant-Rate Instances
For some natural circuit classes, we can obtain a "constant rate" encoding, namely an ARE whose output length is a constant multiple of the description size of the circuit. This type of efficiency cannot be achieved using alternative approaches (e.g., Yao's boolean construction or its ARE variant in Section 8). We demonstrate this for the case of functions whose output can be written as a constant-degree polynomial. 6 We begin with the following theorem:
, and let a i be the number of monomials which depend on x i . Define U, κ, τ = O(κ + log U ), and k = τ γ as in Section 7.1. Then, under the assumption of Theorem 7.1, f has an ARE whose output consists of ( a i ) + k(n + max(a i )) elements of bit-length τ .
Most polynomials of degree d have description length Θ(n d log U ), which in a typical setting of the parameters is the same (up to a multiplicative constant) as the length of our encoding. 7 As an immediate application, let us consider the task described in the introduction, where a weak client wishes to publicly announce the value of a polynomial f applied to a sensitive input x while keeping x private. Here, a constant-rate encoding gives rise to a non-interactive solution whose offline communication complexity is just a constant multiple of the description size of f . This is essentially optimal when f is not fixed beforehand.
Proof sketch of Thm. 7.2: The proof consists of two steps. First, we show that the task of encoding f reduces to the task of encoding certain constant-depth (NC 0 ) arithmetic circuits C : Z n → Z m while preserving the output complexity; then, we use the main ARE compiler to encode C with the desired complexity.
The first step relies on the locality reduction of [4, Lemma 4.17] which allows to perfectly encode f via an arithmetic NC 0 encodingf (x; r). For any fixing of r, the functionf r (x) has the following properties: (1) Each output depends on at most d (original) inputs; (2) The input x i affects at most a i outputs; and (3) The output complexity is 6 The theorem generalizes to the case of multi-output functions where each output is a constant-degree polynomial. In this case, the value a i below counts the number of different monomials T j which (1) contain x i and (2) appear as a summand in one of the outputs. 7 E.g., when the inputs are sub-exponentially large integers in [±2 n ε ], κ = n ε , k = n εγ = o(n), and when a i = O(n d ) and max(a i ) = O(n d−1 ); the latter two conditions hold for most polynomials.
O(m) = O( a i ). Now, by a variant of the composition theorem from [3, Lemma 3.5] , it suffices to encode this class of functions f r (x) r by an encoding g of output complexity ( a i ) + k(n + max(a i )). (Technically, the new encoding g should have a single simulator and decoder that do not depend on the choice of r; see full version for more details.)
It remains to encode the constant-depth (NC 0 ) arithmetic circuitf r : Z n → Z m . To obtain a constant-rate encoding, we combine the key-shrinking gadget with the informationtheoretic encoding of Corollary 5.3. Specifically, by applying the corollary to each output bit of the circuit (which can be computed by a constant-size arithmetic formula) we get an affine encoding forf r with key length O(a i ). Applying the key-shrinking gadget we get n short keys of size k, and a garbled circuit part which consists of additional O( a i ) entries and a single "public" matrix of size O(k max a i ), as required.
A CRT-BASED ARE COMPILER
In this section, we sketch an alternative construction of an ARE compiler over the integers, via a reduction to Yao's original garbled circuit construction. The reduction is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Similarly to Yao's construction, the resulting construction can be based on any one-way function. However, it does not possess the efficiency and generality advantages of our main LWE-based construction.
Recall that Yao's construction requires to use each bit of the input for selecting one key from a pair of keys (k 0 , k 1 ). Since we cannot directly access bits of the input in the arithmetic model, we will instead settle for encoding the selection. Concretely, for each input x ∈ Z and every 1 ≤ i ≤ log U (where U is an upper bound on x), we will define an ARE of a function f i (x, k 0 , k 1 ) = k x[i] , where x[i] denotes the i-th bit in the binary representation of x. By using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), we reduce the latter task to encoding functions of the form f p,i (x, k 0 , k 1 ) = k (x mod p) [i] , where p is a small prime (p ≤ polylog(U )). Indeed, applying such a selector function with O(log U ) distinct primes p j for each i, we get a selection of keys corresponding to a binary CRT encoding of x. We can now feed these keys to Yao's construction applied to the following boolean circuit C . The circuit C first applies CRT decoding to the bits of the CRT encoding of each input x (whose keys are given by the outputs of f p,i ), and then computes C on the bit-representation of its inputs.
It remains to describe an ARE for the functions f p,i . We can assume, without loss of generality, that the keys k 0 , k 1 are integers in the range [0, p − 1]. (The construction can be repeated in parallel to handle κ-bit keys.) The function where R is a uniformly random integer in [0, 2 κ + p p ]. Finally, since f p,i can be computed by an arithmetic branching program of size poly(log U ) (modulo a prime of bit-length poly(κ, log U )), we can apply Fact 5.1 and again Lemma 5.2 to get a statistical ARE for f p,i and hence for f p,i .
